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This empirical research studies the impact in the performance of privately-owned ‘Class A’ 
banks in Nepal (2012-2015) after the banks’ merger laws (2011) in Nepal, assessing the 
systemic performance regardless of bank’s merger status. The data was sourced from the 
Central Bank of Nepal. The research adopted a multiple linear regression analysis to 
assess the impact of relevant indicators on the performance (e.g. profitability). The analysis 
shows that non-performing loans have a negative and significant impact on performance, 
whereas net interest margin has positive and significant impact. Another relevant 
conclusion is that, capital adequacy ratio, statutory liquidity ratio and bank size have 
positive effect, although not statistically significant to impact the performance. Finally, banks 
are highly dependent on interest income, and despite high liquidity levels, non-performing 
loans negatively impact the performance, which seems the result of not complying with 
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Evaluation of performance of commercial banks routinely has been crucial to ensure the 
financial stability, and many central banks or other financial institutions are increasingly 
applying standard framework for assessing financial stability and publishing the regular 
reports on financial stability (Cihák 2006). However, there is no explicit meaning of 
financial stability or systemic risk among central banks (Oosterloo & de Haan 2004).  
Global economic recovery is highly dependent on accommodative monetary policies in 
advanced economies, nevertheless extended monetary ease may give rise to excessive 
risk taking (IMF 2014). A monetary expansion policy and a positive productivity shock 
increase bank leverage and risk (Angeloni & Faia 2013). Stakeholders (e.g., 
stockholders, depositors, managers, analysts) frequently use data from financial 
statements to evaluate the performance of commercial banks. Uniform financial rating 
system, namely ‘CAMELS’ (Capital Adequacy, Assets, Management Capability, 
Earnings, Liquidity, Sensitivity) introduced originally by US regulators, has been 
increasingly used all over the world to assess the performance of banks (Nimalathasan 
2008; Dash & Das 2013; Roman & Şargu 2013; Abdul Rahman & Masngut 2014). 
Financial and economic liberalization may potentially open the banks to revitalized 
business climate, trade, regulation, and joint ventures, but essentially could also trigger 
undesirable economic and social effects. Ghosh (2005) points out that financial 
liberalization might lead to propensity to financial crises due to greater freedom to 
invest in sensitive sectors such as real estate and financial securities, increased exposure 
to particular sectors and clients, and lowered access to funding for small-scale 
producers. In the context of financial liberalization in Nepal after mid-1980s, the 
number of Banking and Financial Institutions (BFIs) in Nepal had grown from 5 in 




1985 to 272 in 2011 (NRB 2015a, p. 2), after which the number of BFIs gradually 
started to decrease due to the enforcement of Merger Bylaws 2011 (NRB 2011) by 
Central Bank of Nepal (Nepal Rastra Bank - NRB). Merger Bylaws 2011 was issued 
primarily with an intention to integrate the unwanted high banks density, resolve the 
liquidity crisis that was unfolding, encourage BFIs to increase the capital through 
merger, discourage the malicious competition among BFIs, enhance the systemic 
performance of BFIs, and notably the central bank facilitated rebates, discounts and 
waivers for banks opting for mergers (NRB 2011). 
The paper primarily intends to empirically study about the holistic and systemic 
performance of all ‘Class A’ 27 private commercial banks in Nepal from 2012-2015 
after the introduction of Merger Bylaws 2011, regardless of whether any Class A 
private bank have merged with any other BFIs or not. The paper subsequently follows 
through following sections - part two is about literature review, part three reviews 
research methodology, part four debates the model and hypothesis, part five presents 
results, part six discusses conclusions and part 7 recommends from the research 
findings.  
 
2. Literature Review 
Many researchers have conducted studies about the bank mergers, systemic risk, effect 
on the performance of banks, and in some case understand the motive of the Central 
Banks. Hosono et al. (2006) investigated the reasons and aftermath effect of the 
consolidation of co-operative banks in Japan from 1984-2002, having concluded that 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) has increased the cost efficiency of acquiring banks, 




elevated the loan interest rate and increased both profitability and efficiency, although, 
this did not improve the CAR - Capital Adequacy Ratio of the consolidated [merged] 
banks relative to its peers, as Return on Assets (ROA) of the consolidated banks were 
not sufficient to meet the minimum CAR. The banks’ mergers analyzed from the 
interbank money market angle, as Carletti et al. (2007) suggest, could lead to 
improvements in money market availability, a factor that might produce financial cost 
advantages and increase reserve holdings, which might essentially have a positive effect 
on the performance of the banks. Carletti et al. (2007) also suggest that large mergers 
generated an increase in the expected aggregate liquidity needs, eventually fulfilling the 
minimum liquidity requirement required by the central banks. Another viewpoint relates 
to cost efficiency (Beccalli & Frantz 2009) impact of M&A operations influence on the 
performance of banks; taking a sample of 714 deals involving European Union (EU) 
acquirers and targets throughout the world from 1991 to 2005, concluded that M&A 
operations accompany minor decline in Return on Equity (ROE), cash flow return and 
profit efficiency, but with a noted progress in cost efficiency, which might have a 
relevant impact in performance. 
Somoye (2008) examined the performance of government induced banks consolidation 
in Nigeria in a post-consolidation period, for the purpose of financial stability, risen due 
to a credit crisis and transatlantic mortgage financial chaos, concluding that the 
mergers’ consolidation program has not been effective to improve significantly the 
performance of banks. Somoye (2008) advocates that the process of bank consolidation 
should be market driven in order to ensure an efficient process in the light of 
competitiveness in the banking sector. A different view is advocated by Grandin & 
Saidane (2010) stating that the global financial turmoil has induced the state 




intervention to consolidate the banks and underline their soundness. However, the 
authors argue that M&A normally occurs from private market forces, compelled by the 
efficiency and profitability of the merged entities, and question if managers might have 
been induced in their haste to enter into M&A transactions. 
Khan (2011) concluded that Indian banks have been positively affected by of M&As 
during the post liberalization regime. Financial parameters that include Gross Profit 
Margin, Net Profit Margin, Operating Profit Margin, Return on Capital Employed 
(ROCE), ROE and Debt-Equity Ratio were considered for measuring performance of 
banks, having concluded that there have been efficiency gains through M&As, and 
subsequently passed the benefits to the equity shareholders in the form of dividend. 
However, Sohini Ghosh & Dutta (2015) observed about 10 M&A deals in Indian 
financial institutions,  between 2000 to 2010, having concluded that there is no 
significant change in the performance of banks. In another market, Lai et al. (2015) 
made a comparative analysis of financial ratios of Malaysian local banks to evaluate the 
impact of bank mergers on profitability, cost reduction, liquidity, leverage and 
shareholder’s equity, having concluded that in this market there was no important 
improvement in the performance and efficiency of the merged banks.  
From the empirical findings of the researches emerged the idea about the most adequate 
variables to be used in the statistical analysis of the dissertation for analyzing the 
performance of the 27 privately owned banks in Nepal during the merger wave era 
between 2012-2015. Notably, some of the indicators implied are ROA, ROE, Capital 
Ratio/Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR), Profit Margin, Liquidity Ratio and Leverage 
Ratio. 




3. Research Methodology 
The primary focus of this study is to make descriptive and empirical analysis of total 
performance of all Class A 27 private systemic commercial banks from 2012 to 2015, 
after Central Bank of Nepal issued ‘Bank and Financial Institutions Merger Bylaws 
2011’. Over this period, many BFIs have opted for mergers. Mergers were primarily 
horizontal across different categories of banks, notably in Class A commercial private 
banks.  Horizontal merger happens when one entity acquires other entity within the 
same line of product or services in the same geographical area to eliminate the 
competition, and this kind of merger was primarily promulgated by Central Bank of 
Nepal. Class A banks are classified as those banks whose paid up capital is at least 2 
billion Nepali Rupees (NRs), whereas less paid up capital for Class B, C and D 
categories of banks in decreasing order (NRB 2015c, p. 89), and corresponding to 
2015/16 monetary policy of Central Bank of Nepal (NRB 2015b, p. 12), Class A banks 
are required to raise minimum paid up capital from current 2 billion NRs to 8 billion 
NRs by 2017, almost 4 times than the level in 2015, and subsequently in similar order 
for other categories of banks. 
The model excludes the 3 State-owned commercial banks out of 30. The reason to 
choose Class A commercial bank is that these banks represent the majority of total 
assets and liabilities among all BFIs of Nepal; on the other hand, the reason to exclude 
the 3 State-owned banks is that two of them are contributors to outlier’s effect. As of 
July 2015, commercial banks absorbed 78.7% of total assets/liabilities followed by 
development banks - 13.3%, finance Companies - 4.8% and micro-finance development 
banks - 3.1% (NRB 2015a, p. 3).  




3.1 Dependent Variable Selection 
The literature researched focus on two common traditional performance indicators that 
are primarily used in BFIs: ROE and ROA respectively, although, the selection of 
performance indicator depends on the type of measure of performance. A situation 
relates to the analysis of the economic measure of performance, including the Economic 
Value Added (EVA) and Risk-Adjusted Return on Capital (RAROC) indicators, which 
were considered to be more appropriate, whereas to analyze the market-based measure 
of performance, the Total Share Return (TSE), Price-Earnings Ratio (P/E), Price-Book 
Value Ratio (P/B) and Credit Default Swap (CDS) might be more appropriate. Share 
investors in Nepal appear to take investment in equity as a hedge against inflation and 
contemplate stock as an alternative financial instrument (Shrestha & Subedi 2014). 
As the literature consistently shows (Hosono et al. 2006; Beccalli & Frantz 2009; Khan 
2011; Sohini Ghosh & Dutta 2015; Lai et al. 2015), the study assumes ROE as a 
performance measurement of the shareholder value. ROE has fundamentally been one 
of the key indicators for measuring performance, and applied to allot capital inside and 
across divisions. 
3.2 Independent Variable Selection 
Selection of independent variable is in line with the Basel II (BCBS 2006) regulatory 
requirement about capital, liquidity and asset quality, which is also followed standard 
by the Central Bank of Nepal (NRB 2010) . Similarly, we take into account about the 
measures of income and size of the banks to realize the outcome of systemic merger 
synergies.  




Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) 
Capital adequacy is employed as the measure of bank’s capital to risk-weighted assets 
(BCBS 2006). CAR is primarily used as the regulatory capital ratio. Bank’s capital 
could be expressed as Tier 1, Tier 2 and if necessary Tier 3 capital - Tier 1 capital 
consists shareholders' equity and disclosed reserves, Tier 2 capital consists undisclosed 
reserves, revaluation reserves, general provisions/general loan-loss reserves, hybrid debt 
capital instruments and subordinated term debt, and Tier 3 consists short-term 
subordinated debt covering market risk (BCBS 2006). In 2015, the minimum CAR for 
Class A commercial bank is 10% in Nepal with Tier 1 Capital at least 6% (NRB 2015d, 
p. 13). Bateni et al. (2014) found positive and significant relationship between ROE, 
ROA and CAR in Iranian private banks from 2006-2012. Abiola & Olausi (2014) also 
found that there is significant impact between ROE, ROA and CAR in Nigerian 
commercial banks from 2005-2011. Valkanov & Kleimeier (2007) investigated about 
the role of regulatory capital in mergers of banks, and they found that US targets are 
more capitalized than their acquirers, and this aids US banks to raise their capital levels 
above the regulatory capital to avoid inquiry. Based on Central Bank of Nepal’s laws 
and directives (NRB 2010; NRB 2011), we expect that CAR has positive impact on 
systemic performance of banks in Nepal in the merger wave era (2012-2015).  
Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR) 
SLR is the ratio of measure of liquid assets to Net Demand and Time Liabilities - 
NDTL (Reserve Bank of India 2015). Demand liabilities are defined as the liabilities 
that banks are liable to pay on being demanded by the customer – example: savings 
account, whereas time liabilities are defined as the liabilities that banks are liable to pay 
after a certain period of time – example: 2 years fixed account (Reserve Bank of India 




2015). It is something that banks have to maintain a specified proportion of their NDTL 
in the form of liquid assets like cash and gold on top of cash reserve. In general, banks 
in South Asia use this ratio to check the expansion of bank credit, to ensure the solvency 
and liquidity capability of banks, and to encourage the banks to invest in safer assets 
like government bonds. In 2015, the minimum required SLR for Class A commercial 
bank is 12% in Nepal (NRB 2015d, p. 14). Arif & Nauman Anees (2012) found 
negative relationship between liquidity risk and performance of 22 commercial banks in 
Pakistan from 2004-2009. Also, Lartey et al. (2013) examined the relationship between 
liquidity ratio and banks’ profitability listed on Ghana Stock Exchange, and found very 
weak relationship between them. Based on Central Bank of Nepal’s laws and directives 
(NRB 2010; NRB 2011), we expect that SLR has positive impact on systemic 
performance of banks in Nepal in the merger wave era (2012-2015). 
Non-Performing Loan Ratio (NPLR) 
Non-Performing Loan (NPL) is the loan that is being defaulted or is in the process of 
being default, however, there is an issue worldwide about the standard and proper 
definition of NPL (Bholat et al. 2016). Higher NPLR generally implies that any 
financial institution is more susceptible to credit risk (Kauko 2012; Melecky 2014; 
Akinlo & Emmanuel 2014). Ekanayake et al. (2013) found that NPL could be attributed 
to both macroeconomic situation and bank specific factors in Sri Lankan commercial 
banking sector from 1999 to 2012. Similarly, Makri et al. (2014) found strong 
correlation between NPL, ROE and CAR in Eurozone banks from 2000-2008, the 
reason to justify the Eurozone financial crisis. Knapp & Gart (2014) inspected the post-
merger changes in the credit risk of the banks, and found that there are notable changes 
in the mix of loan categories in the loan portfolio after a merger, and NPL rate rises 




considerably after the merger. Based on Central Bank of Nepal’s laws and directives 
(NRB 2010; NRB 2011), we expect that NPLR has negative impact on systemic 
performance of banks in Nepal in the merger wave era (2012-2015). 
Net Interest Margin (NIM) 
According to Financial Times, NIM is ‘the difference between the interest that a bank 
pays to those putting money in the bank and what it gets from those taking out loans’ 
(Financial Times 2016). NIM is one type of income indicator in banks which helps in 
investigating investment decisions compared to the debt conditions, meaning that the 
difference of interest between borrowing and lending. López-Espinosa et al. (2011) 
found that the volatility of interest rate is positively and strongly related to NIM. 
Likewise,  Naceur & Goaied (2008) investigated that the characteristics of individual 
bank explains substantial amount of variation in NIM, and banks which have higher 
capital also have higher NIM and profitability. Based on Central Bank of Nepal’s laws 
and directives (NRB 2010; NRB 2011), we expect that NIM has positive impact on 
systemic performance of banks in Nepal in the merger wave era (2012-2015). 
Bank Size (BS) 
As a rule of thumb, bank size is measured as the natural log of total assets, similar to 
studies conducted by Gul et al. (2011) and Laeven et al. (2016). Bank earnings 
volatility, lending behavior, diversification of portfolios, and hence overall performance 
might be affected by bank size (Pais & Stork 2013). Intuitively, M&As increases the 
size of acquiring bank. Sohail et al. (2013) found a positive and significant relationship 
between bank size and performance of banks. Based on Central Bank of Nepal’s laws 
and directives (NRB 2010; NRB 2011), we expect that BS has positive impact on 
systemic performance of banks in Nepal in the merger wave era (2012-2015). 




4. The Model and Hypothesis 
4.1 The Model  
The concept of multiple linear regression has been applied to form the model. The 
general equation for the model is presented below: 
Y = β0 +  β ∗ X +  ε 
Here, Y is the dependent variable, β0 is constant, β is the coefficient of the explanatory 
variable, X is the explanatory variable and ε is the error term. Similarly, applying above 
model to make analysis on the performance of bank, we start with the following model.  
ROE = β0 +  β1 ∗ CAR + β2 ∗ SLR + β3 ∗ NPLR + β4 ∗ NIM + β5 ∗ BS +  ε 
β0: constant (intercept) 
β1, β2, β3, β4, β5: Slope representing the degree that bank performance changes as the 
independent variable changes by one-unit variable. 
ROE: Return on Equity 
CAR: Capital Adequacy Ratio 
SLR: Statutory Liquidity Ratio 
NPLR: Non-Performing Loans Ratio 
NIM: Net Interest Margin 
BS: Bank size (natural log of total assets in thousands) 
ε: error term 





Hypothesis 1: Bank merger increases CAR, which has positive and significant impact 
on the bank’s performance systemically.  
Hypothesis 2: Bank merger increases SLR, which has positive and significant impact 
on the bank’s performance systemically.  
Hypothesis 3: Bank merger absorbs NPL, which has negative and significant impact on 
the bank’s performance systemically. 
Hypothesis 4: Bank merger increases NIM, which has positive and significant impact 
on bank’s performance systemically.      
Hypothesis 5: Bank merger increases BS, which has positive and significant impact on 
bank’s performance systemically. 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for variables, computed in SPSS 23. Data from 
2012-2015 is taken from Central Bank of Nepal’s website. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for n = 112 
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
ROE -278.73% 33.17% 10.10% 31.06% -7.75 69.23 
CAR 4.07% 24.39% 12.99% 3.21% 1.19 3.11 
SLR 15.09% 53.50% 27.05% 6.12% 1.75 5.16 
NPLR 0.00% 36.20% 2.54% 4.41% 5.65 36.67 
NIM 1.71% 8.20% 3.40% 1.01% 2.05 6.91 
BS 6.75 8.06 7.53 0.26 -0.19 -0.06 
Note: Bank Size (BS) as a natural log of total assets in thousands 




The descriptive statistics shows high variation between maximum and minimum value 
for ROE, and as well certain variation for CAR, SLR and NPLR, well depicted by the 
minimum value, maximum value and standard deviation. Apparently, 2 private banks 
out of 27, namely Grand Bank Limited and Kist Bank Limited are the main contributors 
to this variation. From the analyzed data, it is seen that in 2014 and 2015 Grand Bank 
Limited reported a huge loss with significant portion of NPL, and had negative ROE of 
-278.73% and -89.74% respectively, while Kist Bank Limited having a loss in 2013 and 
2014 posted a profit in 2015 after being merged with other banks, and subsequently 
being renamed as Prabhu Bank Limited while retaining Class A status. 
In average, banks reported ROE of 10.10% which depicts bank’s profitability in merger 
wave era. Negative skewness for ROE shows that bank’s median and mode ROE are 
more than its mean, and high value of positive kurtosis further conveys that the 
distribution is peaked. CAR of 12.99% during 2012-2015, which is above the 
requirement of 10% (NRB 2015d, p. 13) shows that banks have been effective in 
following central bank merger directives (NRB 2011) and Basel II accords (NRB 2010). 
Similarly, banks reported average SLR of 27.05%, which is higher than central bank 
requirement of 12%. (NRB 2015d, p. 14). This confers that the private banks in Nepal 
are in highly liquid state. Nevertheless, the volatility of NPL questions about the credit 
asset quality of the banks. Variation in NIM and BS remained less in comparison to 
other variables evidently shown by the standard deviation of 1.01% and 0.26 
respectively. While CAR, SLR, NPLR and NIM have positive values for both skewness 
and kurtosis, BS has negative values. This observes that mean > median > mode for 
CAR, SLR, NPLR and NIM with peaked distribution, whereas mean < median < mode 
for BS with flatter distribution. 




The high variation in skewness and kurtosis for dependent and independent variables in 
Table 1 indicate that the distributions are not normally distributed, which means that the 
homogeneity of variables are not achieved and assumptions of parametric testing are 
violated. Therefore, to fetch the appropriate output, we have to proceed with non-
parametric statistics assuming any kind of distribution. 
5.2 Spearman Correlation Analysis 
Mathematically, ‘Pearson correlation analysis evaluates the linear relationship between 
two continuous variables assuming normal distribution, whereas Spearman correlation 
analysis evaluates the monotonic relationship between two continuous or ordinary 
variables assuming any kind of distribution’ (Statsoft 2016), as in ours case. Monotonic 
relationship means that the variables incline to change each other respectively, but not 
necessarily at a constant rate. Technically, to understand the effect size of Spearman 
correlation analysis, ‘coefficients between .10 and .29 represent a small association, 
coefficients between .30 and .49 represent a medium association, and coefficients above 
.50 represent a large association’. In general, coefficient below 0.5 indicates the absence 
of high monotonic relationship. 
Table 2 has been computed in SPSS 23 to check the monotonic relationship between 
dependent and independent variables.  
Table 2: Spearman correlation coefficients of variables for n=112  
Variables ROE CAR SLR NPLR NIM BS 
ROE 1 -0.171 0.191 -0.105 0.416 0.691 
CAR   1 0.127 -0.244 0.139 -0.341 
SLR     1 0.143 0.210 0.094 
NPLR       1 0.264 0.086 
NIM         1 0.348 
BS           1 
 




In Table 2, it is seen that BS has slightly large association with ROE, whereas all other 
variables have either small or medium association with each other. We are neglecting 
the marginal impact of spearman correlation between BS and ROE in our multiple 
regression analysis. ROE is positively correlated with SLR and NIM, whereas 
negatively correlated with CAR and NPLR. This implies that performance of bank 
increases if value for SLR, NIM and BIS increases, while performance of bank 
decreases if value for CAR and NPLR increases. 
5.3 Multiple Regression Analysis 
Table 3 presents the significance of regression model, whereas Table 4 presents the 
regression beta coefficients, statistical significance of independent variables and 
collinearity statistics. All values are computed in SPSS 23. 
Table 3: Model Significance   
ROE = β0 +  β1 ∗ CAR + β2 ∗ SLR + β3 ∗ NPLR + β4 ∗ NIM + β5 ∗ BS +  ε 
 
 
Table 3 evidences that our model is statistically significant for a level of 1% 
significance (F=19.288; p=.000). The variance of independent variable is explained in 
45.2% (Adj. R2) by the dependent variables which depicts how the model fits with the 
phenomenon under analysis. In statistical analysis, ‘Durbin-Watson tests for 
autocorrelation in the residuals from a statistical regression analysis, whose value 
ranges from 0 to 4’ (Statsoft 2016).  A value of 2 indicates no autocorrelation in the 
sample. Values that are approaching toward 0 indicate positive autocorrelation, whereas 
values toward 4 indicate negative autocorrelation. In the model, value of 2.485 indicates 
R2 Adjusted R2 Std. Error F Sig. Durbin-Watson 
.476 .452 23.00260% 19.288 .000 2.485 




that residuals tend to have negative autocorrelation, but not high. We neglect this 
marginal impact.  
Table 4: Regression coefficients  
  Beta T Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
Constant   -1.409 .162     
CAR .047 .459 .647 .475 2.107 
SLR .038 .522 .602 .956 1.046 
NPLR -.615 -6.864 .000** .616 1.624 
NIM .196 2.111 .037* .574 1.741 
BS .137 1.353 .179 .479 2.086 
* p<0.05; **p<0.01     
 
Table 5 summarizes the expected and real outcome of independent variables with level 
of significance. 
Table 5: Summary of Outcomes 
Independent Variables Expected Outcome Actual Outcome Significance 
CAR Positive Positive not significant 
SLR Positive Positive not significant 
NPLR Negative Negative significant** 
NIM Positive Positive significant* 
BS Positive Positive not significant 
          * p<0.05; **p<0.01 
‘The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is a measure that checks the impact of collinearity 
among the variables under consideration in a regression model’, defined in statistics 
(Statsoft 2016). The VIF is computed as the reciprocal of Tolerance. The generally 
accepted rule is that VIF shouldn’t be greater than 10. Table 4 indicates that VIF values 
are very smaller than 10, which confers us an idea that the collinearity among regressed 
variables are smaller. 




In Table 4, it is seen that CAR has positive coefficient in the merger era, but statistically 
not significant (t=.459; p=.647). It is expected that CAR has positive relationship with 
bank’s performance, however, the hypothesis that CAR has significant effect on the 
bank’s performance systemically in the merger wave era has been rejected. This 
questions whether banks in Nepal are capable to absorb any unprecedented level of loss, 
protect its depositors, and promote the stability and efficiency of the financial system 
systemically. The study has been similar to Hosono et al. (2006) finding that even 
though M&A increased the bank’s profitability, it didn’t improve the capital ratio. 
However, this is in contrary to Bateni et al. (2014) and Abiola & Olausi (2014) findings 
regarding statistical significance.  
Second hypothesis that bank mergers increases SLR, which has significant impact on 
bank’s performance systemically has been rejected (t=.522; p=.602), however the 
positive coefficient indicates that SLR has positive relationship with the bank’s 
performance, as expected. Depositing more liquid assets in the Central Bank might not 
be a favorable condition for banks, however systemically this might be essential to 
ensure the finance stability. One of the reasons why Central Bank of Nepal pushed 
Merger Bylaws 2011 (NRB 2011) was about the liquidity crisis that was unfolding 
starkly. Nevertheless, statistically not significant SLR implies that even though banks 
might have maintained regulated liquidity, this has not been substantial to advance the 
systemic performance of banks. This finding is closely related to Lartey et al. (2013) 
finding. As Carletti et al. (2007) published that big mergers have behavior to increase 
the expected aggregate liquidity needs and eventually fulfil the liquidity requirement as 
provisioned by the Central Bank, which is also reported in our study, however, this 
doesn’t improve the systemic performance of banks. 




Our hypothesis that bank mergers absorb NPL systemically, which has negative and 
significant impact on bank’s performance is significant (t=-6.864; p=.000) at 1% 
significance level with higher negative regression coefficient. This is in line with the 
Somoye (2008) finding that banks consolidation risen due to credit crisis and 
transatlantic mortgage financial chaos has not been effective to improve the 
performance of banks. This fundamentally articulates that being statistically significant, 
bank mergers absorb NPL systemically, but this doesn’t improve the systemic 
performance of banks.   Questions arise about the credit quality of the banks whether 
they are appropriately following the Basel II risk requirements as mandated by the 
Central Bank of Nepal (NRB 2010). Essentially, credit risk management practices need 
a greater scrutiny. 
Our hypothesis about NIM is evidenced to be statistically significant (t=2.111; p=.037) 
at 5% significance level as expected. This means that bank mergers have impact on 
NIM systemically, which is positive and significant. We can also infer that banks have 
been able to exploit the revenue synergies coming from mergers. Thus, we can make a 
correspondence that banks in Nepal are more dependent on the interest income, and 
interest spread is normally higher to yield large profits as López-Espinosa et al. (2011) 
published that the volatility of interest rate is positively and strongly related to NIM. 
Likewise, mergers tend to increase the capital and similar to Naceur & Goaied (2008) 
findings, higher capital have higher NIM and profitability. 
Coefficient for BS after merger is expected to be positive, which is evidenced in Table 
4, however statistically not significant (t=1.353; p=.179). This underlines that even 
though bank mergers increase the bank size, this doesn’t improve the performance of 
banks systemically in the merger wave era and increase in bank size through mergers 




have not been efficient to realize the cost synergies and exploit the economies of scale. 
This is contrasting to Sohail et al. (2013) finding. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This study is primarily conducted to distinguish the holistic and systemic performance 
of all 27 private commercial ‘Class A’ banks in Nepal resulting from the merger wave 
era 2012-2015 after Central Bank of Nepal published the Merger Bylaws (NRB 2011). 
Hypothesis about independent variables i.e. NPLR (negative and significant effect) and 
NIM (positive and significant effect) has been statistically significant, while other 
variables tested don’t have statistical significance.  
Even though the performance of banks is explained fairly (45.2%) by the independent 
variables under analysis, the rejection of hypothesis about CAR, SLR and BS raises 
uncertainties. The high negative coefficient NLPR further increases the stake. The study 
realizes that banks in Nepal are vulnerable to absorb the unprecedented credit shock and 
protect its stakeholders in the merger era. Even though banks have higher liquidity, this 
has not been beneficial in improving the performance of banks, and negative regression 
coefficient of NLPR suggests that banks are very susceptible to credit risk. This 
empirical study raises doubt about the investment decisions taken by bank managers has 
yielded appropriate returns, given the context of higher SLR with higher NPL. The 
study also raises doubts whether banks are following a proper risk management process, 
and as well as the externally mandated by Central Bank of Nepal (NRB 2010). 
The empirical study reveals that privately-owned ‘Class A’ banks in Nepal in the 
merger era (2012-2015) are dependent on the interest income as significant portion of 




their revenues, making them exposed to interest rate risk. Any change in interest rates 
might have direct impact in revenues, although the research reveals that, banks have 
been able to leverage revenues’ synergies resulting from the mergers, a number of 
which was horizontal mergers. The study also shows that increase in bank size after 
mergers doesn’t have statistical significance in improving performance. This questions 
whether Central Bank of Nepal’s motives for issuing Merger Bylaws in 2011 (NRB 
2011) has been fulfilled, and mergers’ synergies for cost has been extracted until 2015. 
Some of the constraints for this empirical study include the short time range, small 
sample size, limited availability of data in English, perform analysis across other entry 
and understand the change, as well as the analysis of total systemic performance of 
private banks in the merger wave era rather than only the individual merged banks. 
In conclusion, banks in Nepal are dependent on the interest income, and despite having 
advantage of higher liquidity, non-performing loans are impacting negatively the 
performance of banks in this merger wave. We conclude that banks should comply with 
prudent risk management approach to drive their performance and profitability in 
foreseeable future, and protect the interest of their stakeholders in a robust fashion. 
 
7. Recommendation to the Body of Knowledge 
Our study presents the following recommendations based on the empirical 
substantiation about the holistic and systemic performance of all private commercial 
banks in Nepal in the merger wave era from 2012 to 2015. 
The risk appetite of Nepalese private banks seems vulnerable in the merger era, as 
indicated by the negative beta coefficient of NPLR. This primarily indicates that banks 




are likely to report higher loan loss provision than in normal case, which eventually 
affects the ROE and banks’ performance. While Central Bank of Nepal have tightened 
the rules about over exposure to sensitive sector such as housing and real state, it should 
further scrutinize and supervise the banks if they are strictly following its directives and 
Basel II Pillar I regulatory requirements (BCBS 2006; NRB 2010). Although Central 
Bank of Nepal has implemented supervisory mechanism (NRB 2013) which 
corresponds to Basel II Pillar 2 requirement (BCBS 2006), it should further push to 
standardize the framework for supervisory mechanism. For example, Supervisory 
Review and Evaluation Process – SREP (EBA 2014) implemented EU wide to 
supervise the systemic member banks in EU states, ‘whose overall purpose is to warrant 
that financial institutions have adequate arrangements, strategies, capital and liquidity to 
ensure a sound management and coverage of their risks, to which they are or might be 
exposed, including those revealed by stress testing and risks institution may pose to the 
financial system’ (EBA 2014). Central Bank of Nepal has already assessed the 
implementation of Basel III (BCBS 2010) for new capital regulation in 2015/16, and 
highlighted that there will be need of additional capital for buffers like capital 
conservation buffer and countercyclical buffer along with liquidity monitoring 
framework although banks in Nepal are maintaining higher than the minimum capital 
ratio (NRB 2015e). We recommend Central Bank of Nepal to make further push 
towards it to make financial institutions more robust to absorb the unprecedented shock 
in future. 
The study reveals that banks in the merger wave era are more dependable on interest 
incomes. Although high interest spread is profitable for banks, this isn’t the sustainable 
way of generating the income. For example, European banks are struggling due to low 
PERFORMANCE OF COMMERCIAL BANKS IN NEPAL 
24 
or even negative interest rate (ECB 2016). Therefore, Central Bank of Nepal should 
strategize to push the banks to consider viable and sustainable business model where the 
earnings from interest plays a minor role, and essentially mitigate any kind of risk in 
economic meltdown scenarios. 
Banks internal governance and risk management procedures have significant effects on 
their risk profile and business model sustainability (Aebi et al. 2012). Like Single 
Supervisory Mechanism – SSM framework (ECB 2014) implemented by ECB, Central 
Bank of Nepal should always have high and specific expectations regarding bank’s 
boards, and expect the board to demonstrate its capacity for independent challenging 
and oversight of senior management. The board should essentially have risk perspective 
and forward looking approach on strategic discussions. 
We believe this study would be useful to academicians, researchers, Central Bank and 
banks in Nepal. Moreover, this study could also be used as a source of knowledge in 
further research about bank’s performance and profitability not only in the merger era 
from 2012 to 2015, but also essentially across larger time-period with cross analysis.  
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